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1 Introduction
International production, trade and investment are increasingly structured in so-called global
value chains (GVCs) where each country specialises in one or few stages of the overall pro-
duction process. This is a well-known phenomenon labelled in the literature “international
fragmentation of production” (Jones and Kierzkowski, 1990).1 Today, more than half of world
trade in manufacturing goods consists of intermediate goods and more than 70% of trade in
services involves intermediate services (de Backer and Miroudot, 2013). Thanks to lower trade
and investment barriers and to advances in information and communication technologies, firms
are able to organise their operations internationally through outsourcing and offshoring of activ-
ities, according to the comparative advantage of the different locations in increasingly specific
tasks: R&D, production of individual parts and components, assembly, marketing, distribu-
tion, etc.. As firms are profit maximizing agents, the decision to participate in GVCs should
be motivated by higher productivity and competitiveness, for instance through the access to
either cheaper or better intermediate goods and services.
From a macro perspective, fragmentation of production across borders may have both positive
and negative effects on a country’s aggregate productivity, output and employment growth.
This depends, for instance, on the share of value added produced by the production stages that
are kept domestically compared to those that are outsourced, as well as on their technological
or skill content. There is a widespread perception that the positive effects, both static (lower
costs and better inputs) and dynamic (reallocation of factors towards more efficient tasks), more
than offset any loss due to the outsourcing of valued added previously produced domestically.
Nevertheless, especially due to data limitations, we still lack of empirical evidence to quantify
these positive effects in terms of some measure of macroeconomic performance.
This paper makes a first attempt to fill this gap: using country-sector data, we evaluate the
impact of the international fragmentation on the growth of productivity and employment. The
analysis presented in this work focuses on the effects of backward fragmentation, defined as the
propensity of a economy to exploit GVCs in order to obtain intermediate inputs from abroad.
2 We consider several measures of productivity, in order to shed some light on the channels
through which participation in GVCs affects economic growth.
First of all, we look at standard measures of labour productivity, such as output and value
added per worker. Moreover, we look at aggregate employment to test whether the changes
1Alternative terms used in the literature are: vertical specialisation (Hummels et al., 1998), global production
sharing (Feenstra, 1998), international outsourcing (Grossman and Helpman 2002), international production
networks (Ernst and Guerrieri, 1998).
2In a previous version of this work, we also looked at forward integration, defined as the propensity to
export intermediate goods, but we could not find any effect of this form of GVC participation on productivity
growth. This “no-result” could indicate that the mechanisms through which exporting intermediates affects
macroeconomic variables are more complex than those from assembling components into final goods, and that
our framework is not suitable to capture them. We leave the issue for further research.
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induced to labour productivity can be explained, at least in part, by changes in the number of
workers employed.3
We then try to understand the effect of the integration into GVCs on TFP growth. While
any change in labour productivity can depend also on changes in the use of capital and, in
the case of output per worker, in the use of intermediate goods, TFP is instead defined as the
residual efficiency of the production process that cannot be explained by inputs’ services. At the
firm level, TFP growth is determined by technical and organizational innovations that improve
the efficiency in the use and combination of inputs. We will refer to this component of TFP
generically as technology. At a more aggregate level, for instance at the country-sector level
that characterizes our analysis, TFP can vary not only in response to changes in technology
within firms, but also in response to the reallocation of resources between firms with different
levels of TFP. Borrowing from Finicelli et. al (2013), who extended the work of Eaton and
Kortum (2002), we will decompose the growth rate in aggregate TFP at the country-sector
level into the technological growth and the growth driven by resource reallocation. We will
then asses the effect of the international fragmentation of production on the two components
separately.
Our empirical strategy is based on the methodology introduced by Rajan and Zingales (1996) to
deal with reverse causality between external finance and growth. Here we identify the effect of
participation in GVCs on productivity and employment growth by exploiting the variation in the
degree of integration in GVCs across 50 countries and the “fragmentability” of the production
process across 18 sectors.4 The interaction term between the country-specific measure and the
sector-specific measure captures how much a country is exploiting the sector’s potential for
production fragmentation.
We measure backward integration in GVCs using indexes of specialization in importing interme-
diate goods. In defining “fragmentability”, we distinguish between sequential GVCs (snakes)
and horizontal GVCs (spiders) (see Baldwin and Venables (2013)). Snake production chains
require the processing of intermediates to be performed in sequential stages, until final assem-
bly. Spider-type chains, instead, involve simultaneous production of all parts and components,
which are then assembled in the final good. We will consequently measure both the length
and the width of GVCs as they refer, respectively, to the snake and spider dimensions of the
production chain.
We find that the participation in GVCs positively affects labour productivity and TFP in sectors
with long and wide production chains in countries specialised in importing intermediate goods.
We also find that the impact on TFP in sequential GVCs comes from technology improvement,
which could be driven both by the availability of a wider variety and better quality of inputs
3Participation in GVCs is often perceived as resucing employment, because it leads to a reduction in the
demand of workers employed in those stages of production that can be outsourced.
4The actual sample size varies depending on data availability.
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and by higher incentives to innovation. On the other hand, in horizontal GVCs TFP growth
comes essentially from resource reallocation, probably due to an import competition effect.5
Finally, there appears to be a negative effect on aggregate employment growth only in case of
of horizontal fragmentation.
The existence of a positive link between productivity growth and firms’ access to new inputs
through imports is not novel in the literature: other papers document the beneficial effect
of imported intermediates. Amiti and Konings (2006) show that a reduction in import tariffs
generates the largest productivity gains (in comparison with a reduction of export tariffs), since
it stimulates intermediate imports. The existence of a link between intermediate imports and
productivity is also confirmed by Bas and Strauss-Kahn (2014) in France and by Kasahara and
Lapham (2013) in Chile. Halpern et al. (2011) estimate that one third of productivity growth
in Hungary between the early ’90s and the early 2000s was due to imported inputs. In India,
Goldberg et al. (2010) also uncover substantial gains from trade through access to previously
unavailable imported inputs. In the EU import competition from China has led to an increase
in technical change within firms and a reallocation of employment towards more technologically
advanced firms. These effects account for almost one sixth of EU technology upgrading between
2000 and 2007 (Bloom et al., forthcoming).
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes our empirical methodology and
the key regressors. Section 3 presents the productivity measures which will be the dependent
variables in the empirical analysis in section 4. Section 5 presents some concluding remarks.
The appendices collect some supplementary material and all the tables.
2 Empirical strategy
Interpreting the relation existing between a country’s economic performance (e.g. productivity)
and its degree of integration in GVCs as causal can present several challenges. There can
be omitted variables underlying the correlation between the two phenomena: for instance,
integration in GVCs is positively correlated with trade openness, and trade openness tends to
be positively correlated with real GDP and productivity growth (Alcala` and Ciccone, 2004).
Another problem is given by reverse causality: is it integration in GVCs that drives productivity
growth or higher productivity growth that makes it easier for countries to integrate in GVCs?
To interpret these correlations in a more causal sense it is necessary to identify the mechanism
through which participation in GVCs affects macroeconomic performance and to find evidence
supporting its relevance. Participation in GVCs could allow a country to increase productivity
by enabling firms to access the best intermediate inputs, by stimulating the reallocation of
resources towards more efficient tasks or by triggering technological advances. Of course these
5See for instance Amiti and Konings (2007), Trefler (2004) and Roberts and Tybout (1991).
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effects tend to be larger, the more the production process characterising a given sector can
indeed be fragmented into many separate production stages. We then test whether sectors
whose technical characteristics make them more “fragmentable” are relatively “better off” in
economies with a high degree of participation in GVCs. This simple test, inspired by Rajan
and Zingales (1996), has two main virtues. First, it focuses on the mechanism via which
participation on GVCs could affect macroeconomic performance, thus providing a stronger test
of causality. Second, as it is based on the simultaneous variation of both a country-specific and
a sector-specific dimension, it allows to control for missing variables using fixed effects for both
countries and industries.
Our empirical model is thus given by:
zi,s = α+ βYi ×Ws + δln(Zi,s) + γΦi,s + θi + ωs + i,s (1)
where zi,s is the growth rate of macroeconomic variable Zi,s (either productivity or employment)
in country i and sector s between the ’90s and the 2000s, Yi is the country-specific measure
for participation in GVCs, Ws is a sector-specific measure of the possibility to fragment the
production process and Φi,s is any country-sector control. All the r.h.s. variables are computed
with data referring to the beginning of the period (the ’90s) in order to avoid further problems of
reverse causality. Our specification always includes country fixed effects, θi, so as to capture all
those sector invariant country characteristics that could affect macroeconomic performance (e.g.
trade openness and specialization, institutional development, etc.); industry fixed effects, ωs,
to capture any industry-specific characteristics that could also affect the economic performance
(e.g. technological content, level of world demand, etc.); and the level of the dependent variable
in the ’90s, ln(Zi,s), to control for the initial condition Our task is to estimate the coefficient
β for the interaction term between the country-specific and the sector-specific variables. A
positive coefficient would tell us that the benefits from a country’s integration in GVCs are
higher for sectors that provide greater opportunities to fragment the production process.
As we aim at describing the long-run relationship between international fragmentation of pro-
duction and macroeconomic performance, avoiding short-term fluctuations, our variables are
constructed as ten-year averages, with the ’90s given by the period 1990-1999 and the 2000s by
2000-2009. We thus focus on the growth rate between the ’90s and the 2000s, when the inter-
national fragmentation of production became a defining feature of international trade flows.
In order to estimate equation (1), we take as a measure of countries’ integration in GVCs
a Balassa (1965) index that measures a country’s propensity to import intermediate goods
relative to the world average, as well as a refinement of the same index that controls for
sectoral specialisation in international trade. As for the sectors’ technological propensity to
fragmentation, we construct two measures. The first is the length of the production process
in terms of the number of stages embodied in each product; the second is the complexity,
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i.e. width, of the assembly operations in terms of the number of parts and components from
different sectors put together to produce the final product. In both cases the interpretation
is the same: the larger the number of inputs, the greater the feasible fragmentation across
different locations. The following subsections describe the key regressors in detail.
2.1 Measures of fragmentability
Our empirical strategy requires us to measure the extent to which production in each sector can
be efficiently fragmented. Our goal is to capture fragmentability as a technological feature of
each sector, with the idea that it is the engineering of the production process that dictates the
way in which different stages of production are linked and can be unbundled. This constitutes
only a prerequisite for fragmentation to take place: only if the country has the propensity and
the capabilities needed to efficiently split the production process can the fragmentation indeed
occur, domestically or internationally, again depending on country’s characteristics.
A GVC is a production network that connects the different phases of an internationally frag-
mented production process, i.e. such that different stages of production take place in different
countries. GVCs can be rather complex production networks. Figure 1, borrowed directly
from Baldwin and Venables (2013), depicts a “general” GVC which may have a rather intricate
architecture.
Figure 1: A general GVC (from Baldwin and Venables, 2013)
In line with Baldwin and Venables (2013) we consider two extreme structures for the production
process: snakes and spiders. Snakes are production networks where value is added sequentially
in each stage of the process, from upstream to downstream, up to final assembly (fig. 2). A
spider is a production network where the parts are produced simultaneously and shipped to a
hub to form a body (final assembly in fig.3), which may be the final product or a new component.
Indeed most GVCs are complex mixtures of the two, and the interest in studying these extreme
cases lies in the fact that they are the elementary building blocks of any production network.
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Cotton to yarn to fabric to shirts is a snake-like process, but adding buttons is a spider-type
element. Silicon to chips to computers is snake-like, but much of value added in producing a
computer is spider-like final assembly of parts from different sources.
Figure 2: A snake GVC
Figure 3: A spider GVC
Snakes and spiders can also be interpreted as two different dimensions of fragmentability: the
first vertical, the second horizontal. We thus define two sector-specific indicators that charac-
terize the fragmentability of the production process:
i. NSnakes , for the length of the value chain, borrowed from Fally (2012), that measures the
number of production stages required for producing the final output of a given industry
s (vertical fragmentability);
ii. NSpiders , for the width of the production process in a given industry s, that measures the
number of commodities used in the final production stage (horizontal fragmentability).
Both indicators are based on I-O data for the US provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA). The I-O tables provide a detailed snapshot of the economy, as they show the number
and the quantity of commodity inputs that are used by each industry to produce its output (the
so called “use table”), the commodities produced by each industry (the “make table”), and the
use of commodities by final consumers. This offers us a sort of recipe book for the production
in the US .
The index NSnakes is defined recursively: the average number of production stages of each
industry depends on the number of production stages required by the inputs used:
NSnakes = 1 +
∑
k
µskN
Snake
k . (2)
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where µsk is the value of input k used to produce 1 dollar value of output of industry s. In other
words, the index is equal to 1 (the final production stage), plus the number of stages required
to produce each of the inputs, weighted according to the unit input requirements. Equation (2)
provides a system of linear equations that, for
∑
k µsk < 1, has a unique solution for the vector
N Snake.
In practice, starting from the make and use tables, first we derive the direct requirement table:
this is an n-by-n matrix DR with entries µsk. Then, we obtain the n-by-n total requirement
table TR = (I − DR)−1, which shows the production required of a given commodity k, both
directly and indirectly, per dollar value of delivery to final use by each industry s.6 For instance,
if the diagonal entry for the computer and electronic good industry and the computer and
electronic commodities is equal to 1.2, it means that, to provide final users with $1 billion of
output from the computer and electronic good industry, requires $1.2 billion of computer and
electronic products, both directly and indirectly in the production of other commodities (for
instance in producing machinery and equipment, that are then used as direct inputs by the
computer and electronic good industry). The solution to the system in (2) is simply the sum
of the total requirements of each industry.
As shown by Failly (2012), the “snake” measure is the average number of stages of the pro-
duction chain, in which each stage is weighted by the share of value added in that stage. High
values of the index indicate that many sectors are involved in the process, thus making it fea-
sible to reallocate different production phases in different countries. With this index we aim
at capturing only the potential, not the actual, extent of (international) fragmentation. One
limitation of Failly’s (2012) index is that it takes into account only the sequence of the different
stages without considering their horizontal complexity. For instance, a good that is produced
using one input only, which is also produced using only one input, produced again with one in-
put, has three production stages, each properly weighted, while a good produced by assembling
3 different raw materials as inputs has only one production stage.
In order to account for the horizontal complexity of the production process, we define the index
NSpiders simply as the number of inputs k used by industry s, considering only those inputs that
enter directly in the final stage of the production process:
NSpiders =
∑
k
1{µsk>0}, (3)
6Playing around with the make and use tables, it is possible to derive different version of the direct and total
requirement tables: commodity-by-industry, commodity-by-commodity, industry-by-industry, and industry-by-
commodity (see also Horovitz and Oosterhoven, 2016), where the distinction between industries and commodities
comes from the fact that some firms are classified into industries according to their primary commodity output,
but they could produce more then one commodity. Following Fally (2012), we present the results using the
commodity-by-industry approach, meaning that the tables present the value of commodities required as inputs
for the output of the different industries. Nevertheless, our results are robust to using alternative approaches, as
the fragmentability measures computed with the different approaches are highly correlated.
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meaning that we count the row’s entries µsk of the commodity-industry direct requirement table
that are different from zero.7
The spider-type index is a measure of width of the production process. As such it strictly
counts the number of inputs that are put together in the last stage for final assembly.8 The
higher the number of the components needed to assemble the final good, the more complex
the production process, irrespective of the contribution of each component to the overall value
added. For this reason, we do not weigh the inputs in terms of their contribution to the vale of
the final good. This is an important difference with respect to the snake-measure: in that case,
as we are interested in measuring the length of the production process, we have to consider the
contribution of all the inputs ever used in any of the stages that brings to the final assembly. It
is then necessary to weigh each intermediate stage’s contribution in order to take into account
its relevance in the overall production chain.
We compute both our indicators for the 127 industries (53 thereof belong to manufacturing)
that enter the BEA’s I-O table at the NAICS 4 digit-level of disaggregation. We then aggregate
the indexes at the same level of the of the productivity data provided by Levcehnko and Zhang
(2014), which is 2-digit ISIC rev. 3 with few adjustments, encompassing 18 manufacturing
sectors. (see table 1).9 10
We use US data, as we want to measure a technological feature of the production process
that does not depend on each single country’s characteristics. Industries in the US, being on
average on the technological frontier and not heavily constrained by institutional inefficiencies
and frictions, should be able to organise the production process in a way that is as close as
possible to the optimum and that best reflects the technological characteristics of the sectors. In
other words, technical and institutional characteristics of the US economy should allow firms to
fragment the production process as much as it is profitable, given the technical characteristics
of the sector. We are well aware that by doing so we are underestimating the length and the
complexity of the foreign part of US production chains, since all foreign production steps are
collapsed into a single commodity, generically labeled as “imports”. Indeed we are imposing
for each sector that the length of its global production chain is given by the longest domestic
7Nunn (2007) uses the same indicator to measure a firm’s difficulty to vertical integrate, as the greater the
number of inputs, the harder is for a firm to vertical integrate with all its suppliers.
8Alternatively, as we did for the snake-measure, we could have counted the number of inputs used both
directly and indirectly, not just those in the last stage. The index then would not allow us to distinguish between
horizontal and vertical features of the process.
9The aggregation is given by the weighted average of the indicators for the sectors at the NAICS 4 digit-level
that match into the same ISIC 2-digit-level, according to the concordance table provided by UNSTAT. A perfect
correspondence between ISIC Rev. 3 and NAICS is not possible, even when we consider the NAICS at the 6
digit level: some sectors are associated with more than one ISIC 2-digit code. We chose to match the 4 digit
NAICS I/O code with the more frequent corresponding 2-digit ISIC rev.3 code.
10Alternatively we could have “translated” from NAICS 4 digit to ISIC 2 digit the use and make table, before
computing the indicators. Although this approach implies the loss of valuable information in understanding the
inter-linkages between industries, which can be more easily captured the more disaggregated the data are, our
results are robust to the use of this alternative way of computing the fragmentation indicators.
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chain. However, as the sectors we consider are rather large, we believe that the size of this
measurement error is small.
Data are from the 1997 I-O tables, because this is the earliest release adopting the current
NAICS (North American Industry Classification System), which has a cleaner correspondence
with the ISIC classification than the one covered by our analysis (1990-2010). A problem with
this choice could be that, if the structure of the US production changes fast, then 1997 is not
necessarily representative of the entire period covered by our analysis (1990-2009). To provide
evidence that this is not the case, we computed NSnakes and N
Spider
s using both the 1997 and
the 2002 release of the I-O tables. According to Table 3 in the appendix, for both measures,
the indexes computed in 1997 and 2002 are highly correlated (≥ .90). This suggests that they
tend to remain quite stable over time and, if anything, we are committing a small mistake. Also
note that the snake- and spider-measures are little correlated with each other, suggesting that
we are indeed capturing different dimensions of fragmentability.
Figure 4 shows the values of the length of the production chains we computed for the sectors
considered in our analysis, while figure 5 depicts their width, i.e. the spider dimension.11 The
length of the average production chain is 2.4 (table 2). This means that, on average, weighting
each production stage by the value added in that stage, the number of stages in the production
chain is 2.4. The longest chains are found in the Food and Beverages, Electrical Machinery,
Communication Equipment and Textiles sectors (respectively 2.78, 2.69 and 2.67 stages) while
the shortest are in Tobacco Products, Medical, Precision, and Optical Instruments and Rubber
and Plastics Products (respectively 1.78, 2.02 and 2.05 stages).
The width of the average production chain is 96 (out of the 127 that we consider), i.e. on
average each final good requires assembling 97 inputs from both the manufacturing and the
service sector. The widest production chains are found in Food and Beverages, Rubber and
Plastics Products, Furniture and other Manufacturing and Transport Equipment, while the
narrowest are Leather Products and Tobacco Products. As this measure is not weighted, it
depends on the level of aggregation of the data. For instance, in our case the index could never
exceed 127. To eliminate any issue about the scale, in our empirical specification we will take
the natural log of this variable.
The comparison between the two indices also leads to interesting remarks: Optical Instruments
is a sector with a short but wide production chain; in Tobacco Products it is both short and
narrow; in Leather Products it is long and simple; and in Transport Equipment it is both long
and wide.
11We exclude Coke, petroleum products and nuclear fuels.
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Figure 4: Length of value chains from 1997 Input-Output US data (snake dimension)
Figure 5: Width of value chains from 1997 Input-Output US data (spider dimension)
2.2 Index of intensity of international fragmentation
To measure the intensity in international fragmentation of production we employ a variant of the
Revealed Comparative Advantage index (Balassa, 1965), proposed by Hoen and Oosterhaven
(2006). This index compares the share of intermediate goods in manufacturing imports for each
11
country with the average world share:
RCAi =
∑
j∈S
M Inti,j∑
j∈S
MToti,j
−
∑
i,j∈S
M Inti,j∑
i,j∈S
MToti,j
(4)
in whichM stands for imports of manufacturing, the superscripts Int and Tot refer to intermediate-
good and total trade flows respectively, i is the country whose imports are considered, j the
partner country and S is the set of countries under analysis ; all the data refer to the ’90s.12
Goods belonging to the ISIC division 23 (Coke, petroleum products and nuclear fuels) have
been excluded from total trade to minimise the effect of oil price volatility on trade values.13
The range of the indices is [−1,+1]: positive (negative) values indicate that the country is
relatively (de)specialised in the trade of intermediate goods with respect to the world average.
We interpret an index above zero as an indication that producers in country i engage in inter-
national fragmentation of production. In particular, RCAi measures the relative specialisation
in the assembly operations of goods using imported intermediates. Data are from the Bilateral
Trade in Goods by Industry and End-use Category Database by the OECD (Zhu et al., 2011),
which provides values of imports and exports of goods broken down by industrial sectors and
by end-use categories (intermediate goods, household consumption goods and capital goods).
Measures of international fragmentation are being continuously proposed in the literature.14
We prefer to stick with a more traditional Balassa (1965) type index because it captures the
involvement in GVC using a very simple logic: i) GVCs determine trade flows in intermediates,
which can be easily measured, and ii) the relative intensity of these trade flows reveals the
countries’ specialisation in intermediate intensive-activities, i.e. in GVCs.
One possible concern is that a country could have a high RCA measure because it imports more
from sectors that involve a higher share of intermediate goods, rather than more intermediates
within each sector. This means that the variation of the measure across countries would depend
more on their trade specialization than on their propensity to fragment production. To address
this issue we decomposed the RCA measure into two components: one that accounts for the
variation in the share of intermediates across sectors, and therefore depends on the sectoral
specialization; the other that accounts for the variation in the share of intermediate within each
sector (see Johnson and Noguera (2013)):
12The countries analysed in this paper are listed in Appendix A.
13Consequently we leave raw materials completely out of our analysis as i) we restrict to manufacturing, hence
excluding agricultural and mining raw materials, and ii) we explicitly exclude ISIC division 23 goods.
14See, among others, Lafay (1992), Johnson and Noguera (2013) and Koopman et al. (2014). Most of these
measure provide an in-depth view on the role of a country within the GVC (i.e. the position in the “value-added
ladder”), which is not relevant for our analysis although very interesting.
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RCAi =
1
2
∑
s
(
M INTi,s
MTOTi,s
−
∑
jM
INT
j,s∑
jM
TOT
j,s
)(
MTOTi,s∑
sM
TOT
i,s
+
∑
jM
TOT
j,s∑
j,sM
TOT
j,s
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
within RCA
(5)
+
1
2
∑
s
(
MTOTi,s∑
sM
TOT
i,s
−
∑
jM
TOT
j,s∑
j,sM
TOT
j,s
)(
M INTi,s
MTOTi,s
+
∑
jM
INT
j,s∑
jM
TOT
j,s
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
between RCA
(6)
We will then be interested in first the component RCAwithini , which by construction is free from
any effect driven by trade specialisation.
Figure 6 shows the values of the index and its decomposition for the countries in our estimation
sample. 15 Most of the variability in the total index comes from the within component, which
on average accounts for roughly 80% of the overall RCA. India, Korea and Indonesia have
the highest comparative advantage in final assembly (with index values respectively of .27, .15
and .15), while Norway, Australia and the US the least (respectively equal to -.05, -.08 and
-.08). The fact that the index for the US is very low confirms that the country is a relatively
closed economy that imports few intermediates. This evidence further corroborates our choice
of calculating the indices of fragmentability on the domestic I-O tables for the US: indeed the
foreign part of th US final-good production chains is small.
Figure 6: RCA Index and within and between components
15The reference group used in computing the index is given by a sample of 50 countries that account for most
of world trade.
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3 Measures of productivity
We start our analysis by looking at the effects of fragmentation on some common measures
of macroeconomic performance: labour productivity and employment. We will then turn to
theory to estimate a measure of TFP.
3.1 Labour productivity and employment
We measure labour productivity as both (real) output per worker and (real) value added per
worker. An increase in total output can be explained by an increase in TFP and/or in the
use of other inputs (capital and intermediate goods). By definition, an increase in value added,
instead, should not be driven by an increase in the quantity of intermediate goods employed per
worker and can thus be preferred as a measure of labour productivity. On the other hand, an
improvement in the quality of the inputs can be hardly expected to be captured by a standard
measure of value added, and would result in an increase of TFP. Unfortunately, we are not able
to control for changes in the capital stock, which can also affect output and value added per
worker: no data with a sufficient time span exists for the required country-sector coverage.16
This data limitation is a common problem in cross-country analysis and no satisfactory solution
has been proposed yet.
Output per worker and value added per worker could increase also in response to a decline
in sectoral employment. In fact, besides the effects of participation in GVCs on productivity
growth, those on total employment are also widely discussed in both the academic and the
policy debate. International outsourcing may reduce the demand of domestic workers in those
countries and sectors that are more involved in GVCs. To address this possibility, we consider as
another measure of macroeconomic performance the growth rate of employment at the country-
industry level.
Output, value added and employment data come from the 2013 UNIDO Industrial Statistics
Database at the country-industry level. Raw data are expressed in nominal terms. To obtain
real measures of output and value added we use the Producer Price Index (PPI) as the main
deflator. PPIs are collected from OECD (Main Economic Indicators) and IMF (International
Financial Statistics, IFS), supplemented by national sources. Following Rajan and Zingales
(1996), for high-inflation countries, where the difference in collection times between UNIDO
data and the PPI may induce sizeable measurement errors, we replace the PPI with an implicit
deflator of industrial production, given by the ratio between UNIDO nominal manufacturing
output and the index of (real) industrial production (from IMF IFS).
16The EU KLEMS (O’Mahony and Timmer, 2009) database, which to our knowledge has the best coverage,
provides data on capital stock and gross fixed capital formation for just 17 countries and only 14 manufacturing
sectors from 1970 to 2007, with the same gaps for both series. This is too little to include the stocks variables as
controls in a regression as well as to fill the gaps in the stock series using methods such as perpetual inventory.
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According to Table 2, which presents the summary statistics based only on those observations
that enter our estimations, excluding outliers, the average growth of output per worker across
countries and manufacturing sectors between the 90s and the 00s has been around 20%. The
average growth in value added per worker has been lower (11%), while average employment
slightly decreased (−3%). This could probably be explained by an increase in the share of
services, excluded from our analysis, in many of the countries that enter our sample.
3.2 TFP and its components
This section describes the method used to estimate TFP at the country-sector level. Unlike
the measures of productivity described above, TFP is usually defined as the residual efficiency
of the production process that cannot be explained by inputs’ services (labour, capital and
intermediate inputs). Estimating TFP has always been tricky, as it is a non observable param-
eter of the production function. We obtain a model-based measure of TFP from the structural
estimation of a set of Eaton and Kortum (2002) gravity equations, using some calibration and
measurements from US data.
Levchenko and Zhang (2013), building on Finicelli et al. (2013), show that in a multi-sectoral
version of the Eaton and Kortum (2002) model the average TFP, Λsi , of an open economy i in
sector s is given by:
Λsi =
T si
1 +∑
n6=i
Xsin
Xsii
1/θ , (7)
where T si is a technological parameter, X
s
in are the imports of country i from country n in
sector s, Xsii is production net of exports of county i in sector s, and θ is a parameter that
captures the dispersion in the distribution of the technological level across firms. In this theo-
retical framework, T si characterises the mean of the country-sector-specific distribution of firms’
productivities and it can be interpreted as the state of technology of sector s in country i.17
The term
Ωsi ≡
1 +∑
n6=i
Xsin
Xsii
 = (1 + IMP si
PRODsi − EXP si
)
(8)
is a measure of trade openness and captures the effect that the allocation of resources across
firms with different productivities has on the average country-sector productivity.
According to this framework, a technological improvement that increases the mean of firms’
productivity is captured by an increase in T si and leads to an increase of average TFP.
18 Anal-
ogously, anything that induces a reallocation of resources from the least to the most productive
17Eaton and Kortum (2002) assume a Frechet distribution for firm productivity.
18In the original Eaton and Kortum (2002) model without technological change, T si is an exogenous and
constant primitive of the model.
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firms is captured by an increase in Ωsi , and also leads to an increase in average TFP.
We obtain estimations for T si and Ω
s
i , and then study the effect of GVCs participation on TFP
growth via the two different channels. The dependent variable and the results from our analysis
depend on the assumptions that characterise Eaton and Kortum’s (2002) model. Nevertheless,
as all measures of TFP are either based on proxies or derived from the estimation of an underling
production function, we believe that our approach should not necessarily entail more serious
measurement error problems than the other approaches.
3.2.1 The estimation of TFP
The multi-sectoral version of the Eaton and Kortum (2002) model, besides the TFP decom-
position described above, provides simple structural equations for bilateral trade between any
two countries in terms of the relative technology level and geographic barriers:
Xsin
Xsii
=
T sn(c
s
nτ
s
in)
−θ
T si (c
s
i )
−θ , (9)
where csi is the unit cost of country i in sector s and τ
s
in is a measure for the trade costs between
countries i and n for sector s, that can be accounted by bilateral distances (dsin), border effects
(bsin), regional trade agreements RTA
s
in, global remoteness (captured by an exporter fixed effect
exsn, see Waugh(2010)) and an error term:
lnτ sin = d
s
in + b
s
in +RTA
s
in + ex
s
n + η
s
in
Taking logs and plugging in the above expression, equation (9) becomes:
ln
(
Xsin
Xsii
)
= ln
(
T sn(c
s
n)
−θ
)
− θexsn − ln
(
T si (c
s
i )
−θ
)
− θ(dsin + bsin +RTAsin)− θηsin
and it can be estimated, for each sector and period separately, using OLS with exporter and im-
porter fixed effects.19 The estimated importer fixed effects provide a measure for the technology-
cum-unit-cost term T si (c
s
i )
−θ. Given the available degrees of freedom, the estimation performed
by Levchenko and Zhang (2013) is expressed in relative terms with respect the US, taken as
reference country.
The authors kindly provided us with the estimated measure
T si
T sUS
for 75 countries, 20 sectors
and the five decades from the 60s to the 00s. As we are interested, not only in the cross-country
variation, but also in the time variation of the technological productivity, we need to estimate
19All variables used for the estimation by Levchenko and Zhang (2013) are taken as ten-year averages of the
underlying yearly series.
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T sUS in order to pin down each country’s T
s
i . The production function used in Levchenko and
Zhang (2013) implies:
lnQsUS = lnΛ
s
US + α
sβslnLsUS + (1− αs)βslnKsUS + (1− βs)
∑
k
γkslnM
ks
US
where Qs is the output in sector s, αs and βs are Cobb Douglas parameters, Ls denotes
labour, Ks denotes capital, Mks denotes intermediate inputs from each other sector k, with
total requirement γks, and ΛsUS is the total factor productivity (henceforth, TFP). Using data
on output, inputs of labour, capital, and intermediates from the NBER-CES Manufacturing
Industry Database together with the values for αs and βs calibrated by Levchenko and Zhang
(2013), we compute the observed US TFP level ΛsUS for each manufacturing tradeable sector
implied by the above equation. As in Levchenko and Zhang (2013), with Comtrade data we
derive ΩsUS from (8) and use it, together with the estimated Λ
s
US to get T
s
US from (7). Finally,
from the
T si
T sUS
provided by Levchenko and Zhang (2013), we can pin down each T si and, using
again the same two equations, obtain Ωsi and the overall TFP for all the other 74 countries.
According to Table 2, the average growth rate in TFP between the 90s and the 00s in our sam-
ple was 8%, mainly driven by technological change (6%). Growth driven by an improvement
in resource allocation was contained (2%). The sectors “Electrical Machinery and Commu-
nication Equipment” and “Office, Accounting, Computing, and Other Machinery” are, not
surprisingly, among those with the highest TFP growth, especially in emerging and eastern
european economies (as Mexico and Bulgaria). Among the sectors with negative TFP growth,
we find “Wearing Apparel, Fur”, “Printing and Publishing” and, more surprisingly, “Medical,
Precision and Optical Instruments”, both in advanced economies (as Japan and Australia) and
emerging economies (Brazil).
Figure 7 shows the non-parametric distribution of the growth rate for the technological param-
eter T sn for all the country-sector couples for which we have data, regardless of the observation
entering the estimations. Compared to a Normal distribution, the empirical distribution has a
fat tail to the right, indicating that some sectors grew exceptionally fast. We obtain a similar
picture for the distributions of TFP and Ω. This is a further assurance of the plausibility of
our model-based estimates.
4 Estimation Results
In this section we discuss the estimation of equation (1):
zsi = α+ βYi,90 ×Ws + δln(Zsi,90) + γV Asharei,90 + θi + ωs + is
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Figure 7: Distribution of the estimated technological growth rates
for different choices of the variable of interest Zsi,t and for the different measures of fragmentabil-
ity Ws and intensity in GVC participation Yi,90 discussed in the previous sections. As we study
the effect of global production networks on the growth rate zsi between the years 90s and 00s,
our specification includes the initial value of the dependent variable, Zsi,90. In addition to coun-
try and sector fixed effects θi and ωs, we also control for the value added share of each sector
in each country at the beginning of the period, V Asharei,90. This variable aims to capture
any effect coming from countries’ sectoral specialization. In the estimation we exclude out-
liers, defined as observations which are more than 3 standard deviations away from the sample
mean.20
Table 4 displays the results for the specification using the “snake” measure of fragmentability
that, as broadly discussed above, measures the backward length of the production chain: the
higher NSnakes , the higher the number of production stages required to produce s, accounting
also for the stages embodied in the inputs. The length measure is interacted with country
i’s overall revealed comparative advantage for the imports of intermediate goods, RCAi. The
higher the index, the more a country is specialized in importing intermediate goods. The
first two columns show the effect of participation in GVCs on the standard measures of labor
productivity: for both real output per worker and real value added per worker, the coefficients
of the interaction terms are positive, statistically different from zero and close in magnitude
between the two equations. This means that, for sectors that are at the end of long vertical
production chains, labor productivity growth has been stronger between the 90s and the 00s
20We also exclude from the estimation sample goods belonging to the ISIC division 23 (Coke, petroleum
products and nuclear fuels).
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in those countries that, at the beginning of the period, were highly involved in GVCs by
specializing in importing intermediate goods. The coefficient of the variable capturing the
initial condition is always significant with the expected negative sign, while the coefficient for
sectoral specialization is not statistically different from zero.
Any increase in output and value added per worker in sector s could be driven by a decrease
in the denominator, the number of people employed in the same sector, Ls. For instance,
participation in GVCs could imply the outsourcing of inputs previously produced domestically
and, for those inputs that also belong to s, this could reduce the total employment in the sector.
We check for this possibility by estimating the effect of GVCs participation on the growth rate
of employment. Column (3) of Table 4 shows that this is not significantly different from zero.
In other words, the positive effect on labour productivity is not achieved by a reduction in the
number of workers, but by an increase in the output and value they produce.
The last three columns of Table 4 show the results for the effect of GVC participation on the
model-based measure of TFP and its components: technology and resource allocation (columns
(5) and (6) respectively). Our intent is to asses whether the positive effect we found on labour
productivity is driven only by an increase in the use of inputs other than labour, as well as
by an overall improvement in the way inputs are combined either at the micro or aggregate
level. According to column (4) there is a positive and significant effect on TFP and this is
entirely driven by a positive effect on T si , the technological component (column (5)). In fact,
the parameter that captures the effect via Ωsi is null (column (6)). Global value chains increase
the variety and the quality of the inputs available for production, and this would have a direct
effect on TFP (see also Amiti and Knoings (2007), Kasahara and Lapham (2013) and Halperen
et al. (2011)). There could also be an indirect effect on the incentives to innovate, given
by the higher profitability stemming from the use of better inputs and the need to meet the
possibly higher technological standards of the imported inputs. Both effects would show up in
the technological parameter T si .
One possible concern with the results shown in Table 4 is that, by construction, the RCA
measure takes into account the sectoral specialization of a country, not only its intensity in
the use of imported intermediated inputs. This means that a given country i could have
a high RCA measure because it imports more from sectors that involve a higher share of
intermediate goods, rather than more intermediates within each sector. To address this issue
we decomposed the RCA measure into two components, one that account for the variation in
the share of intermediates across sectors, and that depends on the sectoral specialization, the
other that accounts for the variation in the share of intermediate within each sector (see section
2.2). Table 5 reports the estimation results when the overall RCA measure is replaced by its
“within” component. The findings are unchanged: the parameters have the same sign and
significance than in Table 4, if anything they are slightly higher in magnitude.
The effects we found are economically relevant. For instance, consider the case of a country
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increasing its participation to GVCs from the 25th to the 75th percentile of the distribution
of the overall RCA measure, everything else being held constant.21. The positive effect on
TFP would be between 9 percentage points for the sector with the shortest production chain
(Tobacco products) and 13.7 percentage points for the sector with the longest production chain
(Food products and beverages). This is a sizeable impact given that the average growth rate
of the technology level between the 90s and the 2000s in our sample is 7.4% (table 2).
When we turn to the ‘spider’ measure of fragmentability, which assesses the horizontal com-
plexity of the production process, the picture looks slightly different. Sectors that use a greater
variety of inputs in their last production stage experience a much stronger increase in labour
productivity in countries that specialize in importing intermediates (columns (1) and (2) of Ta-
ble 6). This result is in large part driven by a decrease in sectoral employment: the coefficient of
the interaction term in column (3) is negative and significantly different from zero. According
to column (4), there is also a positive and significant effect on TFP which, unlike for the ‘snake’
measure, arises from a more efficient allocation of resources across firms at the sector-country
level (column (6)). On the other hand, the effect on the technological component of TFP is not
statistically different from zero. When the overall RCA measures is replaced by the ‘within’
measure (Tabel 7), findings are basically unchanged.
The results confirm the positive effect of participation in GVCs on both labour productivity and
TFP, but they also suggest that the technological improvement triggered by a greater variety
and quality of inputs is not the only mechanism that can lead to this outcome. Many studies
found positive import competition effects on productivity, see for instance Amiti and Konings
(2007), Trefler (2004) and Roberts and Tybout (1991). The main idea is that imported varieties
increase competition on the domestic market, forcing the least productive domestic firm out
of business and spurring reallocation of resources toward the more productive surviving ones.
As the ‘spider’ measure considers only the last stage of production, many of the inputs tend
to be closely related to the output and to belong to the same ISIC 2 digit-sector (i.e. the
majority of inputs lie on the diagonal of the direct requirement matrix). If the country tends to
import a relatively high share of intermediates, in this sector competition from foreign varieties
increases. Competition pushes employment either towards the most efficient firms in the sector,
or towards firms in other sectors. In the end, this increases labour productivity and TFP at
the country-sector level, even if employment decreases.
We performed several robustness checks: we exclude from our sample the United States, which
we used as a benchmark for the length and width measures; we reintroduce the ISIC rev.3
code 23 (Coke, petroleum products and nuclear fuels), which was excluded from our baseline
sample; and we control for some measure of capital stock.22 The results are not affected by
21This would corresponds to a country such as South Africa to increases its integration in GVCs to the level
of Brazil.
22There are no good measure for capital stock at the country and sectoral level of our analysis. We included
the cumulate gross fixed capital formation at the country-sector level from the UNIDO IndStat data base.
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such changes. We also tested whether the effect is different between countries and sectors: we
did not find any evidence when distinguishing between advanced and emerging economies and
between low and high R&D intensive sectors. As a final analysis we insert the interaction terms
with both the ‘snake’ and the ‘spider’ measures of fragmentability that, according to Table 3,
are positively, yet weakly, correlated (0.38). Results are reported in Table 8. Signs and magni-
tudes of coefficients are basically unchanged, but the effect of ‘snake’-type fragmentability on
labor productivity loses some of its significance, while the negative effect on resource allocation
becomes significantly different from zero.
Overall our results suggest that countries that are involved in global production chains via the
import of intermediate goods experience a stronger productivity growth in sectors with high
fragmentability. Productivity gains can occur thanks to both the availability of more and better
inputs, which increases firms’ TFP, and the import competition that forces the reallocation of
resources towards the most efficient firms within a given sector.23
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented an analysis of the effect of participation in Global Value Chains
(GVC) on labour productivity and total factor productivity (TFP). We appliedhe methodol-
ogy that Rajan and Zingales (1998) proposed to overcome possible reverse causality between
external finance and growth to the relationship between GVC participation and productivity
growth. To this aim we developed several indicators: at the sector level we measure both the
length and the width of GVCs, and at the country level we consider the overall involvement in
imports of intermediate goods as well as a measure that excludes the effect of trade sectoral
specialisation.
Our results support the widespread perception that importing intermediate goods through
GVCs increases productivity in the importing countries. Sectors with long GVCs operating in
countries specialised in importing intermediates experience a boost in labour productivity (in
terms of both output per worker and value added per worker) and in TFP. The latter effect
is entirely driven by a technological advancement, whereas employment levels are unchanged
and no effect comes from resource reallocation. When we turn our attention to sectors with
wide GVCs (i.e. GVCs involving the use of many direct inputs from a variety of different
sectors) we confirm the result on labour productivity and on TFP, yet the channels are different.
Notwithstanding a contraction in employment, there appears to be a significant impact of
resource reallocation but not of tecnological change.
23On the contrary, we do not find any effect of forward integration in GVCs: countries specialised in exporting
intermediate goods do not experience higher productivity growth in sectors that are intensively used as inputs
in the production of other goods.
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A List of countries
The countries analysed in this paper are: Argentina (ARG), Australia (AUS), Austria (AUT),
Belgium-Luxembourg (BLX), Brazil (BRA), Bulgaria (BGR), Canada (CAN), Chile (CHL),
China (CHN), Czech Republic (CZE), Denmark (DNK), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), Ger-
many (DEU), Greece (GRC), Hungary (HUN), Iceland (ISL), India (IND), Indonesia (IDN),
Ireland (IRL), Israel (ISR), Italy (ITA), Japan (JPN), Malaysia (MYS), Mexico (MEX), Nether-
lands (NLD), New Zealand (NZL), Norway (NOR), Philippines (PHL), Poland (POL), Portugal
(PRT), Romania (ROM), Russia (RUS), Saudi Arabia (SAU), Slovakia (SVK), Slovenia (SVN),
South Africa (ZAF), South Korea (KOR), Spain (ESP), Sweden (SWE), Switzerland (CHE),
Taiwan (TWN), Thailand (THA), Turkey (TUR), United Kingdom (GBR), and United States
(USA).
B tables
Table 1: List of sectors
ISICLV K description
15 Food and Beverages
16 Tobacco Products
17 Textiles
18 Wearing Apparel, Fur
19 Leather, Leather Products, Footwear
20 Wood Products (excluding Furniture)
21 Paper and Paper Products
22 Printing and Publishing
23 Coke, Refined Petroleum Products, Nuclear Fuel
24 Chemical and Chemical Products
25 Rubber and Plastics Products
26 Non-Metallic Mineral Products
27 Basic Metals
28 Fabricated Metal Products
29C Office, Accounting, Computing, and Other Machinery
31A Electrical Machinery, Communication Equipment
33 Medical, Precision, and Optical Instruments
34A Transport Equipment
36 Furniture and Other Manufacturing
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Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
∆ln(Q/L) 0.21 0.32 -0.89 1.38 546
∆ln(V A/L) 0.11 0.33 -1 1.15 546
∆ln(L) -0.03 0.39 -1.72 1.56 546
∆ln(TFP ) 0.08 0.24 -0.42 0.84 501
∆ln(T ) T 0.06 0.25 -0.56 0.79 546
∆ln(Ω) 0.02 0.07 -0.53 0.49 501
NSnakes 2.36 0.24 1.79 2.72 546
NSpiders 96 6 78 104 546
RCAi 0.03 0.08 -0.1 0.27 546
RCAwithini 0.02 0.06 -0.1 0.21 546
Table 3: Measures of Fragmentability - Correlations
NSnake1997 N
Spider
1997 N
Snake
2002 N
Spider
2002
NSnake1997 1.00 - - -
NSpider1997 0.38 1.00 - -
NSnake2002 0.94 0.61 1.00 -
NSpider2002 0.32 0.90 0.52 1.00
Table 4: Snake-type GVCs and overall RCA in intermediates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆lnQ
L
∆lnV A
L
∆lnL ∆lnTFP ∆lnT ∆lnΩ
NSnakes ×RCAi 1.20** 1.05** 0.05 0.48** 0.31* -0.14
(0.45) (0.51) (0.72) (0.22) (0.17) (0.11)
V Ashare90s 0.19 -0.09 -0.22 0.43*** 0.66*** -0.48***
(0.53) (0.56) (0.64) (0.13) (0.15) (0.12)
Depend90s -0.09* -0.14** -0.01 -0.42*** -0.24*** -0.52***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.11)
Constant 1.51** 2.13*** -0.27 0.68*** 0.42*** 0.03***
(0.68) (0.71) (0.35) (0.10) (0.10) (0.01)
N 546 546 546 501 546 501
All regressions include country and sector fixed effects. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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Table 5: Snake-type GVCs and “within-sector”RCA in intermediates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆lnQ
L
∆lnV A
L
∆lnL ∆lnTFP ∆lnT ∆lnΩ
NSnake ×RCAwithin 1.51** 1.28** -0.09 0.61** 0.45** -0.19
(0.59) (0.62) (0.91) (0.28) (0.20) (0.14)
V Ashare90s 0.18 -0.10 -0.22 0.43*** 0.66*** -0.48***
(0.53) (0.56) (0.63) (0.13) (0.15) (0.12)
Depend90s -0.09* -0.14** -0.01 -0.42*** -0.24*** -0.52***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.11)
Constant 1.52** 2.13*** -0.27 0.68*** 0.42*** 0.03***
(0.69) (0.71) (0.35) (0.10) (0.10) (0.01)
N 546 546 546 501 546 501
All regressions include country and sector fixed effects. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Table 6: Spider-type GVCs and overall RCA in intermediates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆lnQ
L
∆lnV A
L
∆lnL ∆lnTFP ∆lnT ∆lnΩ
ln(NSpider)×RCA 8.06*** 7.95*** -6.95** 1.62** 0.37 0.87**
(1.92) (1.89) (2.87) (0.63) (0.55) (0.34)
V Ashare90s 0.31 0.03 -0.01 0.46*** 0.66*** -0.47***
(0.51) (0.53) (0.61) (0.12) (0.15) (0.12)
Depend90s -0.09* -0.15** -0.030 -0.41*** -0.23*** -0.52***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.11)
Constant 0.69 1.28* 0.74 0.50*** 0.37*** -0.07*
(0.68) (0.71) (0.55) (0.12) (0.13) (0.04)
N 546 546 546 501 546 501
All regressions include country and sector fixed effects. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Table 7: Spider-type GVCs and “within-sector”RCA in intermediates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆lnQ
L
∆lnV A
L
∆lnL ∆lnTFP ∆lnT ∆lnΩ
ln(NSpider)×RCAwithin 9.93*** 9.34*** -8.76** 2.09** 0.57 1.15**
(2.27) (2.19) (3.81) (0.77) (0.66) (0.44)
V Ashare90s 0.30 0.01 -0.01 0.46*** 0.66*** -0.47***
(0.51) (0.53) (0.60) (0.12) (0.15) (0.12)
Depend90s -0.09* -0.14** -0.03 -0.41*** -0.23*** -0.52***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.11)
Constant 0.83 1.46** 0.60 0.52*** 0.37*** -0.06*
(0.68) (0.71) (0.52) (0.11) (0.12) (0.03)
N 546 546 546 501 546 501
All regressions include country and sector fixed effects. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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Table 8: Snake and spider-type GVCs and overall RCA in intermediates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆lnQ
L
∆lnV A
L
∆lnL ∆lnTFP ∆lnT ∆lnΩ
ln(NSnake)×RCA 0.71 0.54 0.59 0.40* 0.31* -0.22*
(0.45) (0.46) (0.70) (0.20) (0.17) (0.12)
ln(NSpider)×RCA 8.94*** 8.58*** -9.51** 1.53*** 0.08 1.52***
(2.21) (2.08) (4.10) (0.55) (0.59) (0.55)
V Ashare90s 0.27 -0.01 -0.00 0.42*** 0.66*** -0.47***
(0.51) (0.53) (0.60) (0.13) (0.15) (0.12)
Depend90s -0.10* -0.15** -0.03 -0.42*** -0.24*** -0.52***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.11)
Constant 0.812 1.353* 0.814 0.549*** 0.414*** -0.094**
(0.666) (0.694) (0.557) (0.112) (0.123) (0.046)
N 546 546 546 501 546 501
All regressions include country and sector fixed effects. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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